Evil? -- No Problem

In sections X and XI, Philo and Demea catalogue human misery and Philo uses this evidence to prove that either God does NOT exist or He is NOT benevolent. Is this argument sound? If not, where does the argument fail? What about the possibility that suffering is part of some great good like free will or character development (a theodicy)?

NO Brute Facts -- The Principle of Sufficient Reason

You are hiking in a remote wilderness, miles from the nearest building or even cell phone tower. You come upon a clearing and see a crystal sphere hovering over you and emitting colorful light pulses in some seeming order: red, blue, green and the pattern repeats. Should there be an explanation for this odd phenomenon or is it acceptable to shrug our shoulders and mutter "Stuff happens"? Can we extrapolate from this case to a general principle of the universe? If so, can we prove that God (or a reasonable facsimile) exists?

The Relevance of Evolution

One important scientific development unavailable to David Hume or any of his fictional interlocutors is the theory of evolution. For many people today, both theists and atheists, religious believers, scientists and intellectuals, the truth of evolution is bound up with the truth of theism. So what is the significance of evolution for the design argument? Does is it provide evidence for either side of the debate? Over a hundred and fifty years after the publication of Darwin's seminal Origin of Species, it is fitting to ask: where might a discussion of Darwin have fit into Hume's Dialogues?

God -- Or Some Lesser Designer

In Chapter V, Philo devises several arguments that accept that the universe has a designer, but deny that that designer is God. Given our traditional definition that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, is Philo correct? Or is there a response to his arguments? Does it matter if the designer is the traditional God?

MacBeth's Dagger and Other Illusions

Hylas objects to Philonous' idealism by claiming that on his view there is no way to distinguish between veridical appearances and illusions. In other words, idealism implies that the danger than Macbeth sees before his eyes but cannot clutch is just as real as the dagger he uses to kill Duncan. Is this a valid objection? How successful is Philonous' response?

Who Needs God?

Berkeley argues that, given the truth of idealism, God must exist. Is he correct? If so, how valuable is this argument? Does this argument give theists anything to cheer about? Or can we get something less than the omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God that Berkeley believes in?

Much Ado About a Mite

Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?

If a Trees Falls in the Woods. . .

If a tree falls in the woods and there is nobody around to hear it, does it make a sound?  Discuss.  You might want to define what you mean by a "sound," by "nobody," and perhaps even a "tree."

A Noble Failure?

Many of us in class found Descartes' foundational project to fail. Let's assume that he cannot justify all his claims to knowledge by an appeal to the Cogito. What can we learn from this failure? Should we look for a wider class of foundational beliefs? Should we avoid appeals to a God who is not a deceiver? Should we find a different way to justify beliefs that does not require an appeal to foundational beliefs?

A God Chasing Its Tail?

Antoine Arnauld (among others) famously accuses Descartes of arguing in a circle: the principle of clear and distinct ideas requires a non-deceiving God to validate it, but the proof of a non-deceiving God requires the principle of clear and distinct ideas. Is Arnauld correct? If not, why not? If not, at what cost?

The Cogito

In Meditation II, Descartes believes he has both defeated skepticism and discovered a foundational belief that he will use to justify all his other claims to knowledge. He argues that the very act of doubt proves that he exists. Is he right? Does the Cogito disprove skepticism? Even if it does is it a Pyrrhic victory -- or can this belief be the basis for the rest of his knowledge?

When the Walls Come Tumbling Down

Descartes realizes that some of the beliefs he thought were true turned out to be false. In the pursuit of knowledge he seeks to tear down his previous beliefs and build them up again upon a firm foundation. In other words, he is engaged in a foundational project, searching for a class of beliefs that themselves are not in need of justification in order to justify his other beliefs. But is this quest a misguided one? Do such beliefs exist? If not, does that mean that knowledge is impossible? Or is there some other way to justify our beliefs?

Is Ignorance Bliss?

In Chapter 12 of the Republic Socrates argues that pleasure based on the truth is more substantial than pleasure based on illusion and falsehood. Since a moral person is ruled by reason, he or she will have a clearer access to the truth and therefore will choose more substantial pleasure.  But is Socrates correct?  Does it matter if pleasure is based on truth -- or are all pleasure equally valuable?  Does it matter if your pleasure in your spouse's love is based on actual love -- or an amazing acting job designed to finagle your inheritance when you die?  Does it matter if the pleasure you have in the belief you scored a winning touchdown is based on reality -- or a dream which you will never wake up from (since you are in a coma from trying to play a game of football)?   Is ignorance bliss?

Plato's Cave

Plato argues that most of us are like prisoners in a cave who are bound in such a way that we can only see shadows of objects projected on a wall. Not only can we not see the objects that cast the shadows, we cannot even see the objects outside of the cave. A more modern analogy might have the prisoner's watching a movie or perhaps "plugged in" to a virtual reality program. What is Plato claiming about the ordinary person? What is our epistemic state? Do we have any hope in escaping? And most importantly, is Plato correct? In short, what is your interpretation of Plato's allegory of the cave and is the allegory the correct way to view the human quest for knowledge?

Expertise or Popularity?

Plato criticizes democracy throughout The Republic. In Chapter 8, for example, he compares the state to a ship. He argues that it is better to have a captain knowledgeable about navigation steer the ship rather than untrained crewmembers. The crewmembers may be able to persuade the owners to let them sail the ship, but without the proper expertise, the ship will not reach its destination. In other words, Plato argues that democracy rewards popularity over expertise, but it is expertise that is essential for good government. Is he right? Consider some examples from class. Can democracy deal with such long-term issues as global warming when most people would prefer to ignore them? Can it deal with economic recovery when most citizens don't understand economic theory? Or can you give a point in democracy's favor?

Is Plato a Feminist?

Plato, through the mouthpiece of Socrates, advocates some radical views about woman in Chapter 7 of the Republic.  In particular, he argues not only that women can be guardians, but that they can have equal duties (more or less) and an identical education.  The only exception he makes is for physical difference between the sexes.  These views are in stark contrast to a woman's place in 5th century Athens, in which a woman was prohibited from a political life and confined to the domestic household (and had a similarly limited education).  Does it make sense to call Plato a feminist (and does it depend on your notion of feminism)?  Or does Plato still miss something important about women?  Furthermore, have we in 21st century America realized his ideas?

The Definition of Morality

In Chapter 6 of the Republic Socrates defines morality in terms of the proper functioning of the mind.  He states that "[i]ts sphere is a person's inner activity; it is really a matter of oneself and the parts of oneself"(443d). A person is moral if and only if the parts of her mind work together and the rational part guides and directs the other parts.  Given such a definition, Socrates proceeds to show that such a mind is healthy and a disordered mind leads to unhappiness.  Yet is Socrates' definition of morality correct?  Is that definition close to your working definition of morality?  If he fails, where or how does he fail?  Is the connection between morality and mental health as tight as Socrates argues?

Hasta La Vista Homer

As Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger used arguments similar to Plato's in The Republic to restrict the use of violent video games for minors. Even though the law was eventually ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, is such a law morally justified? Examining ONE of Plato's arguments. Can a case be made to prohibit video games? Or is the argument flawed or not applicable to video games? Is the argument more valid as video game technology improves and the simulation of reality more seamless? Is there any form of entertainment that should be kept out of a teenager's hands (or minds)?