Tuesday, October 25, 2016
Who Needs God?
Berkeley argues that, given the truth of idealism, God must exist. Is he correct? If so, how valuable is this argument? Does this argument give theists anything to cheer about? Or can we get something less than the omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God that Berkeley believes in?
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Berkeley argues that an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being exists given the truth of idealism. He argues that all things are mind dependent. However, things are independent of our minds, and they have to exist in some other mind. Therefore a mind that always perceives things must exist, and this mind must be omnipresent and infinite. He concludes that God exists. There are a few problems with this argument. First, the premises do not necessarily lead to the conclusion. From this argument, we do not really get the typical God of the Bible, Torah or Quran. The attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence, which are typically associated with the western concept of god, are not proven by the premises to be associated with the ‘god’ of the conclusion. It is completely plausible according to the premises that ‘god’ is some spirit that continually perceives all things; the spirit does not have to be good, all powerful or even all knowing. In conclusion, Berkeley’s argument is not a proof of the god of Christianity, but it does show a small possibility of its existence. As such, I do not think this gives theists much to cheer about. There is still a long way to go from an infinite perceiving spirit to the Christian god. Another problem I have with his argument as a whole is that it relies completely on the truth of idealism. If, as many people do, you consider at least some qualities of an object to exist outside of any mind, then realism is an inaccurate view. If idealism is false, then Berkeley’s argument falls apart.
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ReplyDeleteIdealism can best be defined by the Latin phrase esse es percipi, or to be is to be perceived. It is the notion that material objects do not exist and everything is mind dependent. Given the truth of idealism, Berkeley attempts an impressive argument for the existence of God, a being traditionally defined as an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. In his argument, Berkeley acknowledges the fact that things can exist independent of OUR minds. For example, if there is no one in a class room, the tables do not disappear from existence. So then he extrapolates that since everything IS mind dependent, “there must be some other mind wherein they exist” – or in other words, there has to be a mind that is always perceiving things even when we are not (46). From this assumption, he goes on to say that this mind that perceives everything is infinite and omnipresent, and concludes the existence of a God.
ReplyDeleteConcisely written in premise form so we can refer to the argument more easily:
1. Things are mind dependent
2. Things are independent of my (our) mind
3. There is a mind that always perceives things
4. That mind is omnipresent (always present) & infinite (so many different ideas)
5. God exists
However, in order to reach a true conclusion, each premise in an argument must also be true. In this case, even assuming the truth of idealism, there are two detrimental faults in Berkeley’s logic that make his conclusion unjustified.
Given the first two premises, the third premise SHOULD be indubitably right; however, there is an alternative possibility. If things are mind dependent and things are independent of our minds, it does NOT guarantee the existence of ONE mind that perceives all. Instead of one big infinite mind, it could be that multiple finite minds are collectively always perceiving. For example, in the case of the classroom tables, just because it seems like there is no one inside the room, it is possible that the tables are being perceived from outside the room through windows, or even that they are being perceived from inside the classroom by an animal or insect. Thus, it is not necessary that there is one grand mind that always perceives things.
Even if we move beyond that flaw and get to the fourth premise, the jump to the conclusion is not justified either. Simply because a mind is infinite and omnipresent does NOT guarantee the traditional all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-benevolent God. Firstly, perceiving everything is not equivalent to knowing everything. For example, if I were to witness someone punching another from a distance, I may believe the former is the bad guy. However, the situation may be that the latter attacked the former, and the punch was just self-defense. Thus, perception is not the same as knowledge of the situation. Secondly, an infinite mind does not equate to infinite power. I can witness as many situations as I’d like, but that does not mean I have the power to change them. For example, I can witness a man dying, but I have no power to stop it from happening. Thirdly, the omnipresent mind does not equate to an omnibenevolent mind that cares about people. Presence does not implicate kindness. I could witness a thief stealing from an old lady, but have no desire to help the victim. Thus, illustrated through the counterexamples, the existence of an omnipresent and infinite mind does not guarantee a traditional God.
While Berkeley attempts to prove a traditional God’s existence through his idealistic views, his logic is flawed in multiple places, and thus his conclusion in unjustified. We cannot even arrive at something less than the omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God that Berkeley believes in due to the alternative possibility of multiple finite minds in premise three.
Nice try Berkeley!
Although George Berkeley offers a somewhat compelling argument for the existence of God, his argument is fundamentally flawed and contradictory to his own ideas of idealism. Even though Adam and Seysha both give good reasons for the weakness of his argument: the fact that he doesn’t PROVE and omnipotent, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent being, but rather just gives the possibility, his argument for the existence of God is actually wrong on a fundamental level. George Berkeley’s whole argument, summed up nicely by Seysha, is based off of his idealist argument that an object cannot exist without a mind to exist in. His first premise says that the existence of things are mind dependent. So, this follows, that objects can only exist when someone is there to perceive them. But, when someone isn’t perceiving the objects, they still exist, so there must be an infinite mind always perceiving every object in the world. However, the first premise is actually not true based on Berkeley’s own reasoning. He explains his reasoning for the first premise when he says, “Or in other words, since all sensible qualities, as size, figure, color, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually changing upon every alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensations; how can any determinate material objects be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct things, each of which is so different from and unlike the rest?” (41).The qualities of materials or objects only exist in the mind. However, there is a slight problem with this: he contradicts himself later on. Berkeley later says that “It is likewise my opinion that colors and other sensible qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and hire hot… And as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I to their existence” (63). Berkeley just said that the qualities are separate from the objects. But, the sensible qualities are the things that cannot exist without the mind. The existence of the object is different. He says that he is “no skeptic to their existence.” The qualities, not the existence, of things are mind dependent. This means that Berkeley’s first premise, that the existence of objects is dependent on the mind, is not true. If the first premise is false, then the fact that there has to be a mind perceiving the objects at all times is also false. Thus, there is no basis for Berkeley’s claim that there is an infinite and all powerful mind called God. Based off of Berkeley’s own logic, the argument for the existence of God fails.
ReplyDeleteIn his Dialogues, Berkeley makes the argument, through his characters, that given the truth of idealism - the existence of things as bundles of ideas instead of realistic objects - God must exist. Berkeley makes the argument that, because ideas must be generated by some mind that is necessarily much more powerful than ours, there must be a singular mind that exists that is doing so - God. However, Berkeley seems to open himself up to many arguments in the specifics of his situation. The flaw that seems to be obvious, at least to a realist is the first assumption that idealism is true. Even to a moderate realist, the idea of an object being generated by the thought processes of an external mind would seem ridiculous because to them objects do possess inherent qualities that define them independent of any minds. Even given the assumption of realism, however, Berkeley’s argument does not seem to foreclose the other possibilities that come as possible causes for such a world that he presents. One quite possible challenge that is raised against Berkeley’s world is, as Seysha mentioned previously, that there is not in fact one mind that creates the world and the ideas that are in it, but rather multiple minds that are constantly creating perceptions that shape our world today. Of course, the ultimate challenge for Berkeley would be to create a deductive rather than inductive argument for the existence of God - that is an argument that guarantees the existence of God should the premises be true rather than only make the existence of God possible. Ultimately, the value of this argument is of course dependent on the strength as well and the so long as the argument exists in its current inductive form, the strength and value seems to be less than Berkeley seems to have made it out to be in his Dialogues.
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